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State TANF Spending:
Does Devolution Matter?
Rhucha Samudra
Augusta University
Using the state-level panel data, this study examines the role of Second-Order Devolution
(SOD) in state TANF spending patterns. The study uses the Within-Between RE model to
examine this connection. No statistically significant effect of second-order devolution is
observed. The race continues to be a strong predictor of state funding and complex effects for
Black, Hispanic, and Asian clients are observed. Such effects encourage a nuanced discussion
of the racialization of welfare policy beyond the dichotomous exploration of black-white
differences. Implications of this evidence are discussed.
Keywords: devolution, TANF spending, race, decentralization, welfare reform

In his Op-Ed in 1995 in Sunday New York Times, Senator Dan Patrick Moynihan stated:
The hidden agenda of the Devolution Revolution is a large scale
withdrawal of support of social welfare, no matter how well-conceived.
The result would be a race to the bottom, as states deprived of federal
matching funds compete with one another to reduce spending by depriving
their dependent population of help.
Such dire warnings were not new during the time of welfare reform. Over the years, no
conclusive empirical evidence of race to the bottom was found. However, one study found
that states who embraced the Second Order Devolution (SOD) under welfare reform
implemented stricter program rules (Kim & Fording, 2010), and another found that clients
living in such SOD states left the TANF program for procedural or administrative reasons at
a higher rate (Samudra, 2019). When the federal government provides the responsibility of
the program implementation to states, it is defined as the first-order devolution. SOD occurs
when states further devolve the responsibility of the program implementation to local
governments.
Studies focusing on the effect of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PROWRA), that created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program (TANF), found plenty of evidence of better employment and earnings among TANF
recipients (Fang & Keane, 2004; Grogger 2001; Kaushal & Kaestner 2001; Looney, 2005;
Schoeni & Blank 2000; Council of Economic Advisors, 1997; Ziliak, et al., 2000; Blank,
2001, 2002). Some studies addressed the state-level spending patterns under the TANF block
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grant (Bitler & Hoynes, 2016; Burnside, 2018; Schott, Floyd & Burnside, 2019); while others
addressed the issue of why state spending on TANF differs (Daley & Vasu, 2003; Mindrum,
2018; Rodgers et al., 2008; Parolin, 2019). Most of the current literature either explains statelevel differences in TANF cash benefits (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Hahn et al., 2017) or
explains the barriers to receipt of cash assistance (Gais & Weaver, 2000; Soss et al., 2001;
Soss et al., 2011).
The present study adds to the literature by focusing on the following questions:
1. How are states spending TANF funds on various activities that satisfy the goals of
PRWORA?
2. What factors affect a state's TANF spending on various activities that satisfy the goals of
PRWORA?
3. Do SOD states spend TANF funds differently than non-SOD states?
Research in this study differs from the current literature in four ways:
1. The study assesses spending patterns over the years among 50-states using state-panel
data instead of many studies that use cross-sectional data.
2. The study focuses on the main TANF objectives that emphasize the provision of basic
assistance, self-sufficiency through employment, and reduction in non-marital fertility.
The study creates broad TANF spending categories that correspond to these priorities.
Thus, the study assesses spending beyond cash assistance which is a primary focus of the
current literature.
3. The study addresses the connection between devolution and TANF spending, which to
our knowledge, is not assessed in the extant literature.
4. The study uses a new panel data analysis method, the within-between random-effects
model, to better understand cluster confounding in panel data.
Some extant literature addresses the effect of SOD on TANF rules and implementation (Soss
et al., 2001; Schram & Soss, 1998; Poole, 2003; Kim, 2008, Kim & Fording, 2010; Soss et
al., 2008). The current study focuses on the role of devolution as it relates to TANF spending
priorities. There is evidence that SOD states tend to have stricter program rules, but do they
also have different spending priorities? The current study results found no statistically
significant effect of county vs. state-level implementation of TANF on spending priorities.
However, race stands out as an essential factor affecting TANF spending. Racialization of
welfare policy appears to go beyond traditional black-white differences, and a complex
picture of the effect of race and TANF spending emerges. The within and between state
differences show that methodologically controlling for these trends provides a more detailed
picture of funding priories over time and across states. The rest of the article is as follows:
Part I discusses PRWORA and welfare administration; Part II discusses the TANF funding
structure; Part III discusses redistribution theories; Part IV details the methodology; Part V
includes results; Part VI contains discussion and conclusion.
PRWORA and Change in Welfare Administration
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PROWRA) in 1996
created the program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). PROWRA made
cash assistance time-limited, added work requirements, and converted welfare into a block
grant (Blank, 2002; Ziliak, 2015). TANF was a unique policy change mandated by the federal
government that states had to comply with to receive federal funds. Under PRWORA, states
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have significant flexibility to develop and implement exclusive programs suitable for the
needs of the state population, provided those programs satisfy the following main goals of
PRWORA:
(1) Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes or in the homes of their relatives;
(2) End the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence
of these pregnancies; and
(4) Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
Transferring responsibility for program implementation from federal to state
governments, known as the First Order Devolution, is not a new phenomenon in the federal
system. However, the further devolution of this responsibility from the state governments to
local governments, also known as the Second Order Devolution (SOD) under PRWORA is
unique. SOD is a part of this implementation innovation where states can choose to provide
more or less authority to the local governments to implement the TANF program.
Program implementation differs from state to state in terms of program rules and the
program's spending preferences. This decision to spend money on different aspects of the
TANF program is influenced by the uniqueness of state economic, social, political, and
administrative factors (Garand, Ulrich & Xu, 2013).
TANF funding structure
TANF funding criteria require states to maintain a certain level of spending based on their
level of spending on Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and related programs
before the conversion to TANF in 1996. Known as the Maintenance of Efforts (MoE)
requirement (Schott et.al. 2012), this provision makes sure that states do not substitute federal
dollars for state dollars (Government Accountability Office, 2012). States must continue
spending 80% of the funds they were using on the AFDC program on MoE. States that meet
the work participation requirement 1 must spend 75% of MoE on activities that satisfy
PRWORA requirements. If a state does not meet the MoE requirement in any fiscal year, the
federal government reduces the dollar to dollar of the state's TANF grant in the following
year. To be counted as the state MoE, the funds should benefit families with children whose
income and resources are under the state-defined threshold. Such benefits should comply with
TANF goals (Government Accountability Office, 2012). States can include spending by local
governments, non-governmental entities (private charities) if that funding satisfies one of the
PRWORA's goals in their MoE spending. In 2011, spending by non-governmental entities in
MoE accounted for 2% of MoE (Congressional Budget Office, 2015).
States have used TANF funds in a variety of ways. For example, figure 1 compares
how states have used TANF monies from 1998 to 2018. On average, states spent 36% of
TANF monies on cash assistance, 38% on work support, and 4% of TANF dollars on family
1

“A state must meet an overall (or “all families”) and a two-parent work participation requirement or face a potential
financial penalty. The statutory requirements for fiscal year (FY) 2016 are 50 percent for all families and 90 percent
for two-parent families, but a state’s individual target rates equal the statutory rates minus a credit for reducing its
caseload” (ACF, 2017).
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formation activities. On average, states spend 22% on other categories, including spending
on one-time payments. While Separate State Programs or SSPs are an integral part of the state
TANF structure, such programs do not fall under the strict PRWORA guidelines. Since the
study aims to assess state spending under PRWORA guidelines, it focuses on block grant
spending at the state level. In the future, a separate study of separate state programs will be
insightful.
Figure 1: Average expenditures on TANF by categories, 1998-2018. Author’s
computation of ACF Data.

Average TANF Spending 1998-2018

22%
36%

Basic Assistance
Work

4%

Family Formation
Other

38%

TANF and Income Distribution
Income redistribution is one of the most contentious policies in the US. Over the years, policy
scholars have developed various explanations about redistribution policy. Similar to previous
studies (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al, 2001), the current study focuses on four main
explanations: second-order devolution, resource pressure, electoral politics, and race and
ethnicity.
Devolution and Welfare Reform
In its essence, welfare policy is an income redistribution policy. Peterson's (1995) functional
theory of income redistribution states that the federal government should assume the
responsibility of the income redistribution but local/state governments should accept the
responsibility of economic development as they have a comparative advantage in those areas.
Subnational governments can allocate resources more efficiently since officials at this level
understand local needs for such resources (Shafritz et al., 2019). However, devolution may
not necessarily increase a state's ability to develop welfare programs that respond to the local
welfare needs if the state cuts benefits to avoid being a welfare magnet (Lieberman & Shaw,
2000). Under the devolution of the welfare reform, state governments have the responsibility
for income redistribution. Some of these states even further devolved this responsibility to
- 140 -
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the local governments. Hence, it is essential to assess how such devolution, specifically
Second-Order Devolution (SOD), affects program spending when state and local
governments have the freedom to implement welfare programs with a very limited federal
grant.
The study classifies state TANF programs into county-administered vs. stateadministered based on TANF Annual Reports to Congress. The states that implement TANF
though counties are addressed as SOD states. Scholars of welfare policy debated the possible
effects of such devolution on welfare assistance. Some scholars expressed concerns over the
race to the bottom efforts between the states via declining benefits, spending, and
stricter sanctioning policies (Peterson & Rom, 1989) as states would avoid being welfare
magnets (Bailey 2005; Bailey and Rom 2004; Figlio et al.,1999). However, research does not
provide conclusive empirical evidence of the race to the bottom (Berry et al., 2003; Johnston
& Lindaman, 1998). Some studies assessed the effect of SOD on state-level caseloads and
found that SOD states were efficient in reducing caseload but also had stricter rules (Kim,
2008; Kim & Fording, 2010). While another study found that welfare clients in SOD tended
to leave the program for administrative reasons rather than employment at higher rates
(Samudra, 2019). Since such devolution is an integral part of welfare program
implementation, it is essential to assess whether it affects states' funding priorities under the
welfare grant.
Resource Pressure
State governments differ in their needs for public services and the ability to raise revenue to
pay for those services. A state’s ability to raise revenue, or fiscal capacity, is a state’s potential
to raise revenue from its sources. This affects a state’s decision to spend on public services
(Iselin, 2017; Toikka et al 2004). In the case of social welfare spending, the literature agrees
that states with higher fiscal capacity tend to spend more on their welfare programs (Gais,
2009; Gais et al., 2009; Rodgers et al., 2008).
Poverty and unemployment create pressure on state resources and play an important
role in states’ welfare spending decisions. Literature finds a positive relationship between
poverty and unemployment rates and public expenditure (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; McGuire&
Merriam, 2005).
Electoral Politics
Partisan politics influences the state's expenditure decisions, especially when it comes to
spending on welfare assistance. According to Plotnick and Winters (1985), political factors
such as social diversity, political party control, interparty competition, interest group
activities, and voter preferences affect welfare policy decisions within the state. Voter
preferences indirectly affect policymaking in a representative democracy via elections, thus
making state policies highly responsive to public opinion (Erickson et al. 1989). Furthermore,
welfare spending is a contested social policy issue in the US (Bane & Ellwood, 1996;
Skocpol, 1996) and programs that are targeted toward a specific group (for example: to assist
blacks) or have a largely negative symbol in political rhetoric (such as food stamps) usually
receive less approval from the public (Jacoby, 1994). Literature finds that public opinion
directly affects policy liberalism (Erickson et al., 1989, 1993; Hill et al., 1995; Wlezien &
Soroka, 2021)
While the public opinion does influence redistribution policy, the role of state
legislators is vital to consider, according to another group of studies that focus on party control
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and welfare generosity. Policymakers do not simply follow voters' policy preferences, but
they also consider state resources, legislative preferences, and other state spending while
considering welfare generosity (Hausermann et al. 2013; Tweedie, 1994). Literature finds
that liberal states and Democratic majorities tend to spend more on welfare assistance
(Barrileux et al., 2002; Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; Rigby & Hatch, 2017). This study uses the
state political ideology index (Berry et al, 2010) to assess the connection between electoral
politics and state TANF spending.
Race and Ethnicity
The issue of race in welfare policy has its roots in the history of broader social policy. The
Racial Classification Model (RCM) predicts that an increase in minority populations on
welfare caseload will lead to stricter welfare policies adopted by the state (Soss, et al. 2008).
Extant literature supports this prediction (Fording et al. 2007; Keiser et al. 2004; Kim &
Fording, 2010; Schram, et al. 2009). The Cadillac driving welfare queen stereotype has
influenced both public and legislative responses to African Americans on welfare. Scholars
find that states with a higher proportion of African American clients on welfare tend to
develop stricter TANF policies (Fellows & Rowe, 2004; Sheely, 2013). In the case of welfare
spending, the literature finds that public attitude (specifically white) opposing welfare
spending (too much spending on welfare) is influenced by stereotypes about African
Americans being poor and lazy (Gilens, 1995, 1996; Wilson & Nielsen, 2011). However, few
studies have explored such a link for Hispanic and Asian populations (Fox, 2004; Soss et al.,
2008). This study explores this connection between race and welfare spending as it relates to
African American, Hispanic, and Asian caseloads.
One of the limitations of current welfare literature is that most studies were conducted
right after the reform and are quite dated. Studies focusing on a long-term assessment of
welfare spending using panel data are also sparse. The present study updates the conversation
on TANF spending and is one of the few to provide an analysis of long-term data including
the years of the Great Recession. A continuous conversation about TANF is vital for
understanding the effect of devolution as a policy choice to deliver safety net programs.
Methodology
Similar to previous studies (Mindrum, 2018; Parolin, 2019), the author created broader
meaningful categories of TANF spending that correspond to the goals of PRWORA. The
following section discusses these four broad categories, and Table 1 provides a detailed
description of these funding categories.
Cash
Basic assistance or cash is the primary source of assistance for TANF families. Welfare cash
assistance has declined over the years in real terms. During the Great Recession, there was
little to no increase in the TANF caseload. During the 1990 recession, AFDC caseload
increased by 21 families per 100 additional unemployed individuals compared to TANF that
saw an increase of 2 families per 100 additional unemployed individuals (Pavetti, 2014).
Thus, over the years, TANF has been reaching fewer and fewer families. Unlike other safetynet programs such as SNAP and EITC, TANF failed to provide a safety net to the needy
(Bitler & Hoynes, 2016; Hahn et al., 2012; Pavetti, 2014).
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Work
At its core, the welfare program is now a work program. Studies found a range of effects of
different TANF policies on the employment and earnings of clients (Schoeni & Blank, 2000;
Blank, 2001; Blank, 2002; Moffitt, 2003; Ziliak, 2015). A review by Grogger and Karoly
(2005) found that reform led to a 20% decline in caseloads and a 4% increase in employment.
On average, states spent 38% of TANF monies on work-related activities from 1998-2018.
The current study assesses state variation in work spending.
Table 1: TANF Funding Categories
TANF Goal
Funding Categories
Provide assistance to
Basic Assistance
needy families so that
children may be cared for
in their own homes or the
homes of their relatives
End the dependence of
Work Subsidies, Education and
needy parents on
Training, Other Work Activities and
government benefits by
Expenses, Transportation Assistance,
promoting job preparation, Non-Assistance, and Individual
work, and marriage
Development Accounts, Job Access,
Child Care Assistance, and NonAssistance, Refundable EITC and
other refundable credits Child Care
Assistance and Non Assistance
Prevent and reduce the
Pregnancy Prevention and Twoincidence of out-ofParent Family Formation
wedlock pregnancies and
establish annual numerical
goals for preventing and
reducing the incidence of
these pregnancies, and
Encourage the formation
and maintenance of twoparent families
Short Term Non-Recurring benefits,
Other Non-Assistance,
Assistance Authorized Solely Under
Prior Law,
Non-Assistance Authorized Solely
Under Prior Law

Variable
Cash

Work

Family Formation

Other

Family Formation
Decline in non-marital fertility and the formation of two-parent families was one of the law's
primary goals. Family cap policy prevents or limits an increase in the family's cash benefit
when an additional child is born while on welfare. As of 2018, 14 states have adopted a family
cap policy (WRD, 2018). Research finds mixed evidence of family cap policy on non-marital
(Horvath-Rose et al. 2005; Jagannathan & Camasso, 2003; Ryan et al. 2006; Joyce et al.
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2002). Along with developing family cap policies, states must spend money on family
formation activities to satisfy the PRWORA goal of family formation and decline in nonmarital fertility. Hence it is crucial to assess what affects state spending in this area.
Other
These are the expenditures states incur that are not directly related to the law's primary goals
but continue to apply to prior permission that a state received. This category also includes
short-term non-recurring benefits, which are one-time payments states can provide to the
client to satisfy the short-term needs without creating an official case. States have developed
rules regarding that assistance, such as diversion payment, and as of 2018, 32 states have
adopted diversion payment policy. The average spending from 1998- 2018 in this category
was 22%.
Data
The current study uses a 20-year panel (1998 to 2018) for all 50 states, excluding Washington
DC. Though DC has one of the most generous welfare policies in the country, DC is a special
district, and devolution of authority under the measure of SOD, which is the primary variable
of interest, does not apply to DC. Under the TANF block grant, states must report their annual
TANF expenditures, caseload, and TANF recipients' characteristics to the Office of Family
Assistance, Administration for Children and Families (ACF). TANF expenditure data and
TANF caseload characteristics data are retrieved from the ACF website. The study uses Total
Taxable Resources (TTR) per capita created by the US Department of Treasury for the fiscal
capacity variable. Traditionally, commonly used measures are Per Capita Personal income
(PCI), Gross State Product (GSP), and Total Taxable Resources (TTR), which provide data
to assess a state's fiscal capacity (Iselin, 2017; Toikka, et al. 2004). However, since TTR
combines GSP and personal income to measure the total value of goods, services, and income
a state could tax (Iselin, 2017; US Department of Treasury, 2002), it provides a better measure
of state fiscal capacity. The University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR)
sources state-level data about poverty, unemployment, and other information. The study uses
the updated government and citizen ideology measure created by Berry et al. (2010) to control
the state political ideology. The SOD code is based on the TANF Annual Report to Congress.
Table 2 provides a detailed description of data sources.
Variable Creation
The operationalization of the dependent variables is as follows: The total TANF expenditure
includes expenditures on assistance and non-assistance. These expenditures are the sum of
state MoE expenditure and the federal TANF grant received by the state. The four dependent
variables, percent spending on cash assistance, work support, family formation, and others,
are computed as a share of the state's total spending (federal and state combined) on assistance
and non-assistance.
The racial composition of the state TANF caseload is an essential variable of interest.
Literature has shown that states with a higher percentage of African American clients tend to
have stricter program rules; however, such assessment in other racial-ethnic groups is scant.
Hence the study assesses the race effect for Asian and Hispanic clients on the TANF caseload.
The TTR per capita measures the state fiscal capacity. Government and citizen ideology
scores measure the state's political ideology, where 0 represents the most conservative value
and 100 the most liberal ideology (Berry et al. 2010). The lagged unemployment rate is used
to capture potential business cycle dynamics (Hardy et al. 2018). The SOD measure is a
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binomial variable that equals 1 if a TANF program is county-managed and, thus, is a SOD
state, and 0 if the program is managed at the state level. I also use benefits discretion as
another measure of devolution. Benefits Discretion =1 if the county has discretion regarding
benefits management and 0 if the state has benefits discretion.
Table 2: Data Sources
Variable
TANF Expenditure

SOD coding

Government and Citizen
Ideology Index

Annual TANF Caseload,
Racial Composition of State
TANF Caseload
State Minority Population

% Children Born to
Unmarried Mothers
Total Taxable Resources
State TANF cash benefit for
the family of three, state
unemployment rate, the state
poverty rate

Code
Percentage. Share to
cash, work, family
formation spending as
part
SOD =1 if TANF is
county-administered and
non-SOD=0 if TANF is
state-administered
0-100, where 0 is the
most conservative
position and 100, is the
most liberal
% black, Hispanic, and
Asian Adults on
caseload
% black, Hispanic, and
Asian population in a
state
% Children Born to
Unmarried Mothers
TTR per capita
% unemployed, % in
poverty

Source
Administration for Children
and Family (ACF)

Annual TANF Report to
Congress

Fording et al. 1998

Administration for Children
and Family (ACF)
US Census

Kids Count Website
US Department of Treasury
University of Kentucky
Center for Poverty Research
(UKCPR)

Empirical model
The study uses the "Within-Between" Random Effect method (Bartels, 2015) to decompose
the time effect within the state and the cross-section effect between the states. The traditional
Pooled OLS model does not account for the difference concerning within and between cluster
effects of variation in the variable. Thus, it provides an estimation of a single effect of the
variable (Bartels, 2015). One of the ways to deal with the within-cluster or time effect of
variables is to use within estimator or fixed effect estimator to time demean the data
(Wooldridge, 2013). However, the FE approach only controls for the within-cluster effects.
Another approach could be to use RE estimation with quasi-time demeaned data. However,
the challenge with RE only approach is that it assumes that the unobserved effect is
uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, which if not satisfied and would lead to biased
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estimation (Wooldridge, 2013). The "Within-Between" model satisfies the assumption of cov
(Xij, uij) = 0 (Bartels, 2015). This model can estimate FE estimates or within-cluster estimates
for time-varying variables and simultaneously estimate between cluster effects. Thus, the
model combines both approaches to provide robust estimates of the effect of covariates.
Estimation for Within-Between Random Effects Model
Yij = γ00 + β1XWij+ γ01 𝑋 1j+ μ0j+ e ij
Where β1 represents the longitudinal effect of the covariates, including SOD status. γ01
represents the cross-sectional effects of the covariates. e ij is the within-cluster error and µ0j
is between cluster error. The model assumes that both errors are distributed normally. The
estimation for the model for family formation spending also controls for the percent of
children in single-parent families. Since reducing non-marital fertility and forming twoparent families was an important goal of PRWORA, this variable is used as a control for the
effect of non-marital fertility. To assess the effects of benefit discretion at the county vs. state
level, another set of analyses is performed.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive results. All data is converted into 2018 dollars using the PCE
(personal consumption expenditure) convertor. On average, SOD states spend 59% on cash
compared to non-SOD states that spend 36% on cash. SOD states spend more on work support
(69%) and family formation (5%) compared to non-SOD states (36% and 4% respectively).
Non-SOD states spend more on other funding (26% compared to 24%). SOD states have a
higher percentage of African American (11%) and Hispanic populations (10%) compared to
non-SOD states (10% and 9 % respectively). SOD states have more African American TANF
caseloads (40% compared to 31%) and Hispanic caseloads (17% compared to 14%). SOD
states have slightly higher TANF cash benefits ($420.06) compared to non-SOD states
($348.61). However, they have a lower unemployment and poverty rate (5.31% and 11.46%)
compared to non-SOD states (5.50% and 12.75). SOD states also have a higher revenue
capacity ($44,779) than non-SOD states ($42,159) but fewer children in single-parent
families (34%) than non-SOD states (38%).
States with higher African American TANF caseload reduce cash expenditures by .58
points. There is no statically significant within-state effect. For a given state, an increase in
Hispanic caseload reduces spending on cash by 1.04 points. There is no statically significant
between-state effect. The effect of the state’s Hispanic population has an overall positive
effect on cash spending. For a given state, an increase in the Hispanic population increases
spending on cash by 1.19 points, and states with a higher Hispanic population increase cash
spending by, on average, .66 points.
The Hispanic population has a curious effect on cash spending. This could be a result
of a state such as California, which has a large Hispanic population. TANF caseload has a
positive effect on cash spending within and between states. An increase in a state’s taxable
resources reduces cash spending by .24%. Ideally, more revenue capacity means a state can
fund more programs. There are two possible explanations. First, since the TANF block grant
is fixed, a state’s revenue may not affect funding under the block grant. Secondly, with an
increase in revenue, states have other priorities for using revenue. For a state, a higher
unemployment rate reduces spending by .3 points but poverty increases spending by .3 points,
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indicating some mitigation of that effect. Though the unemployment rate is an important
indicator of the health of the economy, it only considers those who are actively seeking
employment in computation. For the TANF target population, it may not be the best indicator
of need, given the marginal and transient nature of the welfare population. The poverty rate
might provide a better insight into this population. Hence, as within-state effects suggest, the
poverty rate over time has a positive effect on cash assistance within a state.
Table 3: Descriptive Results
Variable
% Spending on Cash Assistance
% Spending on Work Support
% Spending on Family Formation
% Spending on Other
% African American Population in State
% Hispanic Population in State
% Asian Population in State
% African American on TANF
% Hispanic on TANF
% Asian on TANF
Annual TANF Caseload
Total Tax Revenue Per Capita
TANF Benefits for Family of Three
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate
Government Ideology
Citizen Ideology
% Children in Single Parent Families

Mean
59
69
5
24
11
10
4
40
17
2
998,394.40
45,779.51
420.06
5.31
11.46
48.29
53.75
34

Mean
36
36
4
26
10
9
4
31
14
1
279,192.70
42,159.14
348.61
5.5
12.75
44.73
50.15
38

SOD N=240

SOC N=810

N Total = 1050

Work Support
SOD status has no statistically significant effect on work spending both within and between
states. States with greater African American TANF caseload increase work support spending
by .66 points, but, on average, an increase in African American TANF caseload within a state
reduces work spending by .48 points. It appears that the race effect is the opposite. Perhaps
an increase in African American caseload within a state is affected by stereotypical attitudes
about being poor and black. But states with higher African American caseloads may be using
TANF work support to move black clients into the labor force to get them off welfare. In the
future, a study of states with changing African American caseload within states would provide
a more detailed answer. States with a higher African American population reduce work
spending by 1.41 points but no statistically significant effect of the black population is found
within states. For a given state, as the Hispanic caseload increases over time, spending on
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work support increases by 1.33. Within a state, a long-term increase in unemployment and
poverty reduces spending on work support by .08 and .02 points. This is a curious result.
Unemployment and poverty rates both indicate the need for more help in finding work. But
it appears that, over time, states are not providing for this need through more spending on
education and training.
Family Formation
SOD status has no statistically significant effect on family formation spending both within
and between states. States with a higher Asian TANF caseload on average reduce spending
on family formation by 1.40 points but states with higher Asian population increase funding
on average by .57 points. Perhaps states with higher Asian TANF caseload treat Asians as a
model minority, thus affecting state spending on specific family formation efforts. Perhaps a
higher Asian population means better constituency and support for Asian Americans
struggling with poverty. No effect of unmarried birth is found within or between states. For a
state, as the TANF caseload increases, spending on family formation reduces by 2 percent
over time. Over time, having more caseload may require more investment in other priorities
than family formation activities, which could need longer time and investment. However, a
long-term increase in the unemployment rate increases spending on family formation by 1
point.
Other
SOD status has no statistically significant effect on other spending both within and between
states. States with higher TANF caseload on average spend 8 points less on other spending
and states with higher unemployment rates spend 6 points less. However, for a given state
over time, an increase in unemployment increases spending in the other category, but a longterm increase in the poverty rate reduces this spending by 6 points. For a given state, an
increase in the Hispanic population reduces spending in this category by 1.9 points. To assess
the effects of benefit discretion at the county vs. state level, another set of analyses is
performed. Both sets of results have consistent findings. SOD status has no statistically
significant effect in either case.
Discussion and Conclusion
It appears that SOD status does not have a statistically significant effect on the spending
behavior of states. This effect could be a result of limited information about the county-vs
state-administered TANF program. The county vs state program is coded based on Annual
Report to Congress. Other than the program being county-administered, no two county
programs are similar. Though it is an important distinction, more variation within these
programs calls for in-depth case studies and along with a bird’s eye view study such as this
one.
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Table 4: Model of State TANF Spending using Second-Order Devolution
Cash
Work
Family
Other
Formation
Between Effects
Black TANF
-0.58
0.66
0.14
-0.18
Caseload
(0.21)***
(0.20)***
(0.09)
(0.40)
Asian TANF
0.39
0.78
-1.40
1.59
Caseload
(1.74)
(1.68)
(0.77)*
(3.38)
Hispanic TANF
-0.48
-0.08
0.08
0.27
Caseload
(0.35)
(0.33)
(0.17)
(0.67)
Citizen Ideology
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)**
(0.00)
(0.00)
Government
0.00
0.01
0.00
-0.00
Ideology
(0.00)
(0.00)***
(0.00)
(0.00)
Black Population
0.88
-1.41
-0.08
0.77
(0.58)
(0.56)**
(0.25)
(1.12)
Hispanic Population 1.19
-0.05
-0.19
-0.99
(0.64)*
(0.62)
(0.31)
(1.24)
Asian Population
-0.36
-0.26
0.57
-0.48
(0.74)
(0.71)
(0.33)*
(1.43)
SOD
-0.02
-0.00
0.01
0.03
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.09)
Log (TANF
0.05
0.03
-0.01
-0.08
Caseload)
(0.02)***
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.04)**
Log Total Taxable
-0.02
-0.07
0.03
0.11
Resources
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.34)
Lagged
0.02
0.00
0.01
-0.06
Unemployment
Rate
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.04)*
Poverty Rate

-0.00
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.01)

Unmarried Birth
Rate

0.01
(0.01)
-0.26

-0.00
(0.02)

(0.28)
Within Effects
Black TANF
Caseload

-0.02

-0.48

-0.03

-0.39

(0.27)

(0.26)*

(0.06)

(0.91)
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Table 4 Continued
Asian TANF
Caseload
Hispanic TANF
Caseload
Citizen Ideology
Government
Ideology
Black Population
Hispanic Population
Asian Population
SOD
Log (TANF
Caseload)

Log Total Taxable
Resources
Lagged
Unemployment
Rate
Poverty Rate

Spring 2022

0.72

-0.23

-0.06

-0.58

(0.58)
-1.04

(0.57)
1.33

(0.14)
0.08

(1.98)
1.87

(0.34)***
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00

(0.33)***
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00

(0.08)
-0.00
(0.00)***
0.00

(1.15)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00

(0.00)
-0.03
(0.32)
0.66
(0.31)**
0.44
(0.45)
0.01
(0.07)
0.09

(0.00)*
-0.23
(0.31)
-0.34
(0.31)
0.16
(0.44)
0.04
(0.07)
-0.08

(0.00)**
0.05
(0.08)
0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.02

(0.00)
0.44
(1.09)
-1.90
(1.07)*
-0.67
(1.54)
0.03
(0.23)
0.12

(0.04)**

(0.04)**

(0.01)**

-0.24
(0.08)***
-0.03

-0.08
(0.08)
-0.00

0.00
(0.02)
0.01

(0.12)
0.30
(0.28)
0.05
(0.02)**

(0.01)***
0.03
(0.01)***

(0.01)
-0.02
(0.01)***

(0.00)***
0.01
(0.01)
0.10
(0.13)

Unmarried Birth
Rate
Constant

-0.13
0.64
-0.26
(1.99)
(1.92)
(0.91)
R2 Within
0.115
0.0479
0.113
R2 Between
0.382
0.480
0.320
R2 Overall
0.168
0.139
0.195
Observations
947
947
947
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.06
(0.02)**

0.44
(3.86)
0.0191
0.287
0.0356
947
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Table 5: Model of State TANF Spending using Second-Order Devolution for benefits
discretion
Cash
Work
Family
Other
Formation
Between Effects
Black TANF Caseload -0.58
0.66
0.16
-0.17
(0.20)***
(0.20)***
(0.10)
(0.40)
Asian TANF Caseload 0.70
0.99
-1.03
0.77
(1.80)
(1.77)
(0.84)
(3.53)
Hispanic TANF
-0.47
-0.08
0.04
0.25
Caseload
(0.34)
(0.34)
(0.17)
(0.67)
Citizen Ideology
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)**
(0.00)
(0.00)
Government Ideology
0.00
0.01
0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)***
(0.00)
(0.00)
Black Population
0.93
-1.38
-0.06
0.65
(0.58)
(0.57)**
(0.26)
(1.13)
Hispanic Population
1.22
-0.03
-0.08
-1.08
(0.63)*
(0.62)
(0.32)
(1.24)
Asian Population
-0.49
-0.35
0.41
-0.13
(0.76)
(0.75)
(0.36)
(1.49)
SOD for benefits
-0.07
-0.03
-0.05
0.16
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.05)
(0.19)
Log (TANF Caseload) 0.05
0.03
-0.01
-0.08
(0.02)***
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.04)**
Log Total Taxable
-0.04
-0.07
0.03
0.17
Resources
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.34)
Lagged
0.02
0.00
0.01
-0.07
Unemployment Rate

Poverty Rate

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.04)*

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)
-0.41
(0.28)

0.00
(0.02)

Within Effects
-0.51
(0.26)*
-0.24
(0.57)
1.33

-0.03
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.14)
0.07

-0.40
(0.91)
-0.58
(1.98)
1.90

(0.33)***

(0.08)

(1.15)*

Unmarried Birth Rate

Black TANF Caseload
Asian TANF Caseload
Hispanic TANF
Caseload

-0.02
(0.27)
0.71
(0.58)
-1.03
(0.34)***
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Table 5 Continued
Citizen Ideology
Government Ideology
Black Population
Hispanic Population
Asian Population
SOD for benefits
Log (TANF Caseload)
Log Total Taxable
Resources
Lagged
Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate

Spring 2022

-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.32)
0.66
(0.31)**
0.45
(0.45)
-0.05
(0.10)
0.09
(0.04)**
-0.24

-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)*
-0.23
(0.31)
-0.34
(0.31)
0.16
(0.44)
0.10
(0.09)
-0.08
(0.04)**
-0.09

-0.00
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.00)**
0.05
(0.08)
0.04
(0.08)
0.07
(0.11)
0.00
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.01)**
0.01

0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.43
(1.09)
-1.90
(1.07)*
-0.68
(1.54)
0.01
(0.33)
0.12
(0.12)
0.29

(0.08)***
-0.03

(0.08)
-0.00

(0.02)
0.01

(0.28)
0.05

(0.01)***
0.03
(0.01)***

(0.01)
-0.02
(0.01)***

0.13
(1.96)
947
0.116
0.387
0.169

0.72
(1.93)
947
0.0487
0.480
0.140

(0.00)***
0.00
(0.00)
0.09
(0.13)
-0.29
(0.90)
947
0.111
0.334
0.200

Unmarried Birth Rate
Constant
Observations
R2 Within
R2 Between
R2 Overall

(0.02)**
-0.06
(0.02)**

-0.14
(3.85)
947
0.0191
0.297
0.0362

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

It appears that the race effect of TANF is more complex than previously suggested, a
result echoed by Ojeda et al. (2019). Both African American and Hispanic caseload affects
cash spending negatively but work spending positively. There is a more nuanced difference
here. The effect of the African American TANF caseload is both cross-sectional and over
time. But the effect of the Hispanic caseload is only over time. This suggests that not only is
African American caseload treated differently between states, but even within states, African
American caseload may lead to lower spending. States perhaps treat an increase in minority
caseload over time as a problem and use stricter policies and reduce funding to serve them as
proposed by the RCM. RCM suggests that racialization of policy choices occurs because
policymakers use social classification to understand and implement policy choices (Soss, et
al., 2008). Perceptions about a racial group are based on personal beliefs and racial
stereotypes in policymakers’ minds. Thus, when the minority percentage on caseload
increases, policymakers will view them as tough cases and will implement strict policies to
target these groups (Soss et al, 2008). It appears that the TANF spending pattern follows the
prediction of RCM. Since stereotypes of work ethic are stronger for African Americans than
- 152 https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol29/iss1/8
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Hispanics, RCM predicts the stronger negative effect of African American caseload on TANF
policy than Hispanics.
Asian caseload has a suppressing effect on family formation spending. This could be
due to two reasons. First, the model minority status of Asians may affect the state’s attitude
towards their need. Second, Asian classification under the Census Bureau’s definition
includes “A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast
Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.” This is a very
large and diverse group with a wide variation in social and economic status. Perhaps pulling
them in one category camouflages the important differences between these populations. In
the future, better classification for Asians could help address the nuances among this
population. The effect of Hispanic and Asian caseloads indicates that the effects of the
racialization of welfare policy appear to be more complicated than traditional black-white
differences.
The results find no effect of electoral politics. It appears these factors may not affect
spending under block grants with specific requirements such as TANF. Unlike previous
scholarship (Trisi & Pavetti, 2012; Schott, 2016), the results find a small positive effect of an
increase in the poverty rate over time on cash spending. So even though overall TANF cash
spending might be declining, at least states are responding to poverty over time. States appear
to decrease spending on work support over time even with the increase in unemployment and
poverty. A finding, little surprising. Others have echoed that states have not specifically
targeted TANF recipients to help them prepare for and get work (Safawi & Schott, 2021).
Nuances of the racialization of welfare policy and devolution need to be further
explored. Early scholarship about block-granting welfare cautioned that federal withdrawal
from the welfare system will have significant consequences and states would reduce their
support for the welfare programs (Chernick, 1998; Powers, 2000). This analysis shows mixed
evidence of such decline. On average, SOD states spend more on cash and work support.
Usually, the racialization of welfare policy focuses on negative stereotypes of blacks (lazy,
undeserving) and evidence shows a consistent negative relationship between African
American caseload and strict TANF policies. But as discussed by Ojeda et.al (2019), it is
crucial to explore policy implications if policymakers have positive stereotypes of some
minority groups. Literature shows that even positive stereotypes such as model minority myth
for Asians assume that they do not face financial difficulties and leave an entire group out of
policy conversation (McGowan& Lindgren, 2006; Shih et al., 2019). Hispanics face more
complicated stereotypes, such as being hardworking but also having criminal tendencies
(Brown et al., 2018; Guererro & Posthuma, 2014; Maldonado, 2006). How spending
preferences might be influenced if policymakers have such stereotypes for Asians and
Hispanics? To explore this question, an in-depth qualitative assessment focusing on
interviews with policymakers, front-line workers, and clients might be helpful.
The complexity of welfare reform makes it challenging to declare devolution either a
success or a failure. Analysis suggests that race is still the primary determinant of TANF
spending. If the spending is influenced by the racial composition of the welfare caseload,
policymakers should pause before trying to turn SNAP and Medicaid into block grants. The
restrictive nature of block grants and the effect of race as a predictor of state spending
priorities should act as a caution for future discussion of block granting other safety net
programs.
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